Cui Bono, Redux
Despite the fact that he has presented no evidence establishing
Oswald's guilt, Reitzes nonetheless feels the need to pontificate
upon his motivation. To say that he is on shaky ground here would be
a vast understatement. After all, people who knew Oswald testified
that he was an admirer of President Kennedy who bore him no malice.
No doubt fully aware of this fact, Reitzes has little choice but to
suggest that Oswald was “mentally unstable”. He writes: “The
Warren Commission heard testimony and examined psychological
evaluations from his teen years suggesting he was a greatly troubled
individual.” Indeed Oswald did have a difficult childhood, during
which a spell of truancy led to his being remanded at an institution
named Youth House for psychiatric evaluation. However, as the Warren
Commission reported, “Contrary to reports that appeared after the
assassination, the psychiatric examination did not indicate that Lee
Oswald was a potential assassin, potentially dangerous, that 'his
outlook on life had strongly paranoid overtones' or that he should be
institutionalized.” (WR379)
Essentially, Oswald was a lonely, withdrawn child who suffered from
neglect. As social worker, Evelyn Siegel, reported, she saw “a
rather pleasant, appealing quality about this emotionally starved,
affectionless youngster which grows as one speaks to him.” She
concluded that Lee “just felt that his mother never gave a damn for
him.” (Ibid, 380) Years later as a grown man in the Soviet Union,
following a feigned suicide attempt, Oswald spent three days in a
psychiatric ward for observation. One report concluded that he was
“not dangerous to other people” and another describes him as
being “of clear mind” with “no sign of psychotic phenomena.”
(18H464 & 468) If Oswald's troubled childhood left him “mentally
unstable” the Soviet psychiatrists did not pick up on it. Nor did
the United States Marine Corps. As legendary critic Sylvia Meagher
noted, “The Marine Corps medical records on Oswald for 1956-1959
consistently show no sign of emotional problems, mental abnormality,
or psychosis.” (Meagher, Accessories After the Fact,
p. 244)
Reitzes attempts to resurrect the
notion of Oswald as a “radically leftist...Castro idolater” which
is not something most researchers take seriously today. Although
Oswald frequently told anyone that would listen that he was a
communist or a Marxist, his behaviour indicated otherwise. The fact
of the matter is that Oswald never joined any communist or Marxist
organization, even when living in the Soviet Union, and all of his
known contacts and acquaintances were right-wingers and
anti-Castroites. In the summer of 1963 when Oswald started his own
make-believe chapter of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee in New
Orleans—which, as previously noted, was at the same time the CIA
was running a campaign against the FPCC—it only ended up
embarrassing the organization when Oswald was publicly revealed as a
former resident of the Soviet Union. Once he had discredited the FPCC
in New Orleans by effectively linking the organization with Russian
communism, Oswald moved on. For these reasons, and many more, most
serious researchers now believe that Oswald's self-professed Marxism
was a cover and that he was, in fact, some type of intelligence
asset. A thorough discussion of this subject is beyond the scope of
this critique so interested readers are referred to the books
Conspiracy? by Anthony
Summers, Destiny Betrayed
(second edition) by Jim DiEugenio, and Oswald and the CIA
by John Newman.
Continuing his skewed, hackneyed portrait, Reitzes claims that Oswald
had a “history of violence”. When considering that particular
deceleration, readers should bear in mind that Reitzes is describing
a U.S. Marine who only ever got in one fight during his entire adult
life. As it happens, Oswald was considered so timid by his fellow
Marines that they nicknamed him “Ozzie Rabbit”. One Marine,
Daniel Powers, testified that in his opinion Oswald “was the meek
mild individual that a person felt if he had something, that he
wouldn't really fight to keep it. He would take the easy way out to
avoid conflict.” (8H270) Nevertheless, in support of this supposed
“history of violence”, Reitzes offers “the time he [Oswald]
threatened his sister-in-law with a knife as a teen”, and alleges
that “numerous witnesses...testified about the physical abuse he
directed at his wife.” The first of Reitzes' two examples is barely
worthy of discussion. It refers to the time a 13-year-old Oswald
flashed a pocket knife at his brother's wife. That was the extent of
it. It was silly kids stuff and no one was hurt. The second example
is more complex.
Contrary to the impression Reitzes attempts to convey, there was
actually only one witness who claimed to have first hand knowledge of
Oswald hitting his wife, Marina, and he never “testified” to that
fact. The witness was Alex Kleinlerer who appears to have taken an
instant dislike to Oswald and gave an uncorroborated statement
claiming that he once saw him slap Marina around the face. (11H120)
The only other person who would claim personal knowledge of such
matters was Marina herself who, to say the least, has credibility
issues. As Warren Commission lawyer Norman Redlich noted in a once
secret memo, “...Marina Oswald has repeatedly lied to the [Secret]
Service, the FBI, and this Commission on matters which are of vital
concern to the people of this country and the world.” (11HSCA126)
Indeed, Marina gave so many conflicting stories that investigators
for the HSCA prepared a report titled Marina Oswald Porter's
Statements of a Contradictory Nature which totalled over 30
pages.
Physical abuse was one of the many subjects on which Marina gave
conflicting accounts. During one of her appearances before the
Commission she said that her husband had been a “good family man”
and described only one occasion on which he had hit her after she had
written a letter to a former boyfriend saying she wished she had
married him instead. (1H32-33) Later, she changed her mind and
claimed that Lee was “not a good husband” and had “beat” her
“on many occasions.” (5H594) In all likelihood, neither of these
accounts is quite true. Although Marina attempted to paint herself as
a devoted housewife who suffered at the hands of her abusive husband,
as Norman Redlich suggested, “...there is a strong probability that
Marina Oswald is in fact a very different person—cold, calculating,
avaricious, scornful of generosity, and capable of an extreme lack of
sympathy in personal relationships.” (11HSCA126) There is testimony
that suggests Marina delighted in tormenting and embarrassing Lee in
front of others. Jeanne DeMohrenschildt remarked that when friends
were giving Marina the things that Lee could not afford, she “was
throwing it into his face.” (9H309) Mrs. DeMohrenschildt also noted
that “...she ribbed him even in front of us...if I would ever speak
to my husband that way we would not last long.” (Ibid, 311-12) “I'm
not a quiet woman myself”, Marina testified as she confessed to
provoking Lee. (5H598) More importantly, Lee Oswald was himself
observed covered in scratches inflicted by his wife (12HSCA129) who
admitted that she would hit him and throw objects at him. (5H598)
“...he is not a strong man”, Marina said, “and when I collect
all my forces and want to do something very badly I am stronger than
he is.” (5H389) It is clear that the Oswalds had a tumultuous and,
at times, violent relationship. It also seems apparent that neither
party was entirely blameless.
Although in her earliest interviews Marina could name no acts of
violence by her dead husband, on December 5, 1964, she threw the FBI
a bone and claimed that Lee had told her he had taken a shot at
right-wing zealot, General Edwin Walker on April 10, 1963. (23H391)
Of course, Marina came out with this story during the two month
period that she was being held at the Inn of Six Flags in Arlington,
Texas, in which she was repeatedly interrogated by the Secret Service
and FBI and threatened with deportation. (see 1H79 & 410)
Nevertheless, Reitzes claims that there is “documentary evidence”
to support Marina's story. He does not detail precisely what that
“documentary evidence” is but when we check his citation—pages
688-697 of Bugliosi's book—we see that it consists of an unsigned,
undated note that does not mention General Walker and a few
photographs of Walker's house that were found in the garage of
Michael and Ruth Paine. Not exactly overwhelming stuff.
The truth is that in the eight months the Dallas police investigated
the attempt on Walker's life, Oswald was never considered a suspect.
The mutilated bullet that was recovered from Walker's home was
described by police as being 30.06 steel-jacketed and not 6.5 mm
copper-jacketed like the bullets fired from “Oswald's” rifle.
(Dallas Morning News, April 11, 1963 & 24H40)
Additionally, eyewitness Walter Kirk Coleman told police that almost
immediately after the shot was fired, he saw two men getting into two
different cars in the nearby church parking lot. One of these men
bent over the front seat of his car “as if putting something in the
back floorboard.” The other man got into a light green or blue Ford
and “took off in a hurry”. (24H41) Oswald could not drive and did
not own a car and Coleman later told the FBI that “neither man
resembled Oswald and that he had never seen anyone in or around the
Walker residence or the church before or after April 10, 1963, who
resembled Lee Harvey Oswald.” (26H438)
Also on the subject of violence, Reitzes writes that “The
commission heard testimony that Oswald...believed that societal
change could only be brought about by violent means”. This he again
sources to Bugliosi (p. 937) who quotes from an interview Michael
Paine gave to HSCA investigators in 1978 claiming that it was
“Oswald's belief that the only way the injustices in society could
be corrected was through a violent revolution.” The first thing of
note here is that this hearsay claim was made in 1978—14 years
after the Warren Commission shut up shop. So Reitzes' claim that the
Commission heard such testimony is false. The bigger problem,
however, is that in 1964, when Paine testified to the Commission, he
specifically stated that Oswald “didn't mention advocating violence
or didn't say anything in regard to violence...” (2H411) Paine's
latter day claims can only be regarded as either faulty recollection
or a deliberate attempt to mislead. Either way, this type of
cherry-picking—ignoring earlier, sworn testimony in favour of later
claims more friendly to the author's thesis—is par for the course
with Bugliosi and Reitzes.
Still relying on Bugliosi (p. 938-39), Reitzes tells us that Oswald
“aspired to greatness, though greatness had thus far eluded him”.
In this regard, Bugliosi quotes Marina as stating that her husband
“wanted in any way, whether good or bad, to do something that would
make him outstanding, that he would be known in history.” He also
quotes Texan lawyer Max Clark who knew Oswald very briefly and said
that it was his “general impression” that Oswald “wanted to
become famous or infamous” and “seemed to think he was destined
to go down in history someway or other.” From this I presume we are
meant to conclude that killing Kennedy was Oswald's way of getting
the recognition he so desired. But such reasoning makes little sense
in light of the fact that Oswald protested at every available
opportunity that not only was he innocent but that he was a fall guy;
a “patsy”. Are we really to believe that Oswald decided to kill
the President just so that he could achieve a place in the history
books as somebody's dupe? As just a pawn in someone else's scheme?
Why would he not want to take credit for his “great deed”?
Bugliosi struggles mightily with this question. He weakly suggests
that Oswald's “conduct after the shooting” shows that he wanted
to escape and then “disclose his identity on his own terms and at a
time and place he, not the authorities, chose, such as in Cuba or
Russia.” But Oswald's movements after the assassination suggest no
such thing. When he returned to his rooming house he did not pick up
his passport or pack a bag or do anything that suggested he was
planning on leaving the country. Not only that but, once he was in
custody, Oswald would have had to have known that he was not going to
get away and that there was going to be no opportunity to dictate his
own terms or choose his own place in which to confess. Right then and
there, with the spotlight of the world's media shining directly on
him, would have been the perfect time and place for Oswald to get
recognition if he so desired it. Instead he denied shooting Kennedy
quite literally to his dying breath.
A very good series of articles, making a compelling case.
ReplyDeleteThanks, Martin. FWIW I wasn't trying to "make a case" per se, I just wanted to show what Reitzes misrepresented and what significant information he left out. And the way he did it is the only way to make a case for Oswald as lone gunman. I have yet to see an honest presentation of the official theory. Guys like Posner and Bugliosi use the same methods as Reitzes. And if you have to lie to make your case then the chances are you never really had much of a case to begin with.
ReplyDeleteI bet you would be interested in reading a book called When The Past Came Calling by Larry Kaplan. He has a great handle on the people and events surrounding the assassination and his view is fresh in my opinion. larryskaplan.com is his site for his info. Breathes some new life into Oswald and the like, a compelling read.
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